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Abstract
Past research on gender role attitudes has often focused on individual- rather than country-level ex-
planations. Drawing on European Social Survey data from 21 countries, we examine the effect of soci-
etal normative climates (i.e., shared perceptions of others’ attitudes) on personal attitudes towards
two non-traditional gender roles: Voluntary childlessness and working full-time while children are
young. To detect potential gender differences, we analyse disapproval of men and women separately.
Findings reveal that there are strong differences in normative climates across countries, and that peo-
ple generally perceive more disapproval of women than of men for both behaviours. Most import-
antly, in countries where a higher share of respondents perceives disapproval of these behaviours, re-
spondents themselves disapprove more strongly—even if they do not believe that others disapprove,
and even after controlling for other relevant individual- and country-level characteristics. What is
more, the independent effect of normative climate explains most of the differences between coun-
tries. This robust finding demonstrates the power of country-level normative climates in explaining in-
dividuals’ attitudes and between-country differences in attitudes toward gender roles.
Attitudes towards the roles of men and women in soci-
ety may be more or less traditional, and social norms
within a country may be more or less restrictive in terms
of which behaviours are and are not socially acceptable
for men or women. This article examines the link
between social norms and individuals’ attitudes regard-
ing two non-traditional family behaviours: voluntary
childlessness and working full-time when children are
young. In Western societies, the prevalence of these
behaviours has increased dramatically in recent decades,
although at differing rates across countries and these
behaviours are likely to be seen differently for men and
women.
Drawing on European Social Survey (ESS) data from
21 countries, we examine the impact of individuals’ nor-
mative expectations (Bicchieri, 2006)—that is, percep-
tions of what others believe is appropriate or
inappropriate—on personal attitudes. We further exam-
ine the degree to which such normative expectations are
shared within a society, and how these societal
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normative climates are associated with individuals’ atti-
tudes. Indeed, social norms should be particularly
powerful in exerting their claims when they are consen-
sually shared within particular social contexts
(Elcheroth, Reicher and Doise, 2011). Using a multi-
level approach, we empirically disentangle the effects of
these two aspects of social norms—individual normative
expectations and societal normative climates—on gen-
der role attitudes. Before treating the intersection
between gender role attitudes and social norms, and
introducing our research questions, we briefly address
these topics in their own right.
Gender Role Attitudes
The association between social norms and gender role
attitudes has not yet been investigated systematically.
Much research has investigated individual-level factors
that predict gender role attitudes. For instance, men,
older, and religiously active adults endorse more tradi-
tional gender roles, while women, younger, and more
educated adults endorse less traditional attitudes (e.g.,
Alwin, Braun and Scott, 1992; Brewster and Padavic,
2000; Knudsen and Waerness, 2001; Brooks and
Bolzendahl, 2004; Brajdic´-Vukovic´, Birkelund and
Sˇtulhofer, 2007).
Traditional gender roles emphasize women’s obliga-
tions as mothers and caregivers, and men’s obligations
as breadwinners. We investigate two behaviours that
directly relate to these roles: choosing to remain child-
less, and working full-time when having young children.
These two statuses are poignant because they threaten
traditional notions of adulthood and family life—the
rejection of motherhood and fatherhood, and deviation
from gendered role expectations, whether for fathers in
not being full-time providers or for mothers in not being
full-time caregivers to young children.
Full-time employment is in direct conflict with the
caregiver role for mothers, but is aligned with the pro-
vider role for fathers. Relative to parental employment,
disapproval of childlessness may be less strongly differ-
entiated for women and men, although motherhood is
probably seen as more central to the lives of women
than fatherhood is to the lives of men (Agrillo and
Nelini, 2008). Most studies have not differentiated
between attitudes towards men’s and women’s childless-
ness, but two recent studies have paradoxically found
more disapproval of male childlessness (Merz and
Liefbroer, 2012; Rijken and Merz, 2014). Interestingly,
men with egalitarian gender attitudes have higher fertil-
ity intentions than those with traditional gender atti-
tudes (Puur et al., 2010).
Few studies have investigated the effect of country-
level variables on gender role attitudes. These studies
have demonstrated that country-level gender equality
(Fuwa, 2004) and economic development (Knudsen and
Waerness, 2008) are associated with more equitable
division of labour in households, which is related to gen-
der role attitudes (Jansen and Kalmijn, 2002; Lewin-
Epstein, Stier and Braun, 2006). In countries with strong
support for dual-earner families (e.g., good childcare
coverage rate), people also endorse more egalitarian atti-
tudes and behaviours (Sjo¨berg, 2004; Geist, 2005; Stier
and Lewin-Epstein, 2007; Bu¨hlmann, Elcheroth and
Tettamanti, 2010). Norms may be an important factor
in explaining differences in gender role attitudes
between countries (Alwin et al., 1992; Geist, 2005;
Crompton and Lyonette, 2006; Lewin-Epstein, Stier and
Braun, 2006), and might mediate the effect of policies
on gender role attitudes (Sjo¨berg, 2004).
Social Norms: Distinguishing Normative
Expectations and Normative Climates
Norms are shared social prescriptions for, or proscrip-
tions against, involvement in ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappro-
priate’ activities or roles (Settersten and Hagestad,
1996a,b; Settersten, 2003; Dannefer and Settersten,
2010). They are, by definition, widely shared in social
groups and reinforced through social relationships and
networks and in social institutions, policies, and the
media, among other things. By providing a definition of
what is ‘normal’, social norms can, from functionalist
and constructivist perspectives in sociology respectively,
provide a means for ensuring order in societies and a
sense of security and predictability in the life course for
individuals.
Numerous studies have documented the important
role of social norms in shaping individuals’ attitudes and
behaviours (see Berkowitz, 2004). These studies typi-
cally focus on individuals’ normative expectations
(Bicchieri, 2006)—that is, on perceptions of what others
believe is appropriate or inappropriate. People generally
do not restrict these normative expectations to specific
situations or local communities, but rather apply them
to a larger spectrum of situations and broader imagined
communities (Paluck and Shepherd, 2012).
We should not assume, however, that normative
expectations are completely shared within a society or
that people endorse them without question.
Contemporary societies are marked by the coexistence
of a multitude of beliefs and values, ‘giving rise to practi-
ces of debate, argumentation and contestation’ (Fasel,
2014: p. 28; see also Doise, 1993; Howarth, 2006).
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Perceptions of the attitudes of others are surely shaped
by a wide array of factors, from interpersonal interac-
tions and personal observations of daily behaviour to
the representation of public debates and information in
the mass media (e.g., Mutz, 1998). Perceptions of
others’ attitudes may therefore be based on where peo-
ple live and the networks in which they are embedded.
For instance, highly educated people endorse more egali-
tarian gender attitudes (Knudsen and Waerness, 2001),
so those who are surrounded by many highly educated
people may overestimate the broader distribution of ega-
litarian attitudes.
We call the sum of these different perceptions and
interactions in a country the societal normative climate
and assume that it is associated with personal attitudes.
In recent social psychological research, ‘ideological cli-
mates’ (Cohrs, 2012) of socially shared values and
beliefs have been shown to have an impact on individu-
als’ attitudes towards immigrants, even after accounting
for personal values and beliefs (Sarrasin et al., 2012;
Fasel, Green and Sarrasin, 2013). These studies have
investigated normative climates as the aggregation of
individuals’ own attitudes. We instead aggregate indi-
viduals’ perceptions of others’ attitudes, thus assessing
socially shared perceptions. We thus extend previous
studies by examining societal normative climates along-
side individuals’ normative expectations.
Gender Role Attitudes and Normative
Climates in Europe
Societal normative climates result from historical proc-
esses: They are maintained, challenged, and shaped over
time through both bottom-up and top-down processes
(Fasel, 2014). Gender role attitudes and matters of gen-
der equality have seen dramatic changes in the last half-
century, but there are nonetheless differences across
countries. For instance, people in Eastern European
countries endorse more traditional gender role attitudes
regarding childlessness (Merz and Liefbroer, 2012),
while attitudes regarding maternal employment are
more progressive in Eastern and Northern European
countries (Treas and Widmer, 2000; O’Sullivan, 2007).
Although such differences have been studied with
respect to gender equality (Fuwa, 2004), economic
development (Knudsen and Waerness, 2008), and wel-
fare regimes (Sjo¨berg, 2004; Bu¨hlmann, Elcheroth and
Tettamanti, 2010), we argue that these differences are
partly due to different normative climates.
One reason to study normative climates on the level
of societies is that this level typically corresponds to the
institutional contexts in which relevant policies are
implemented, which both reflect and construct norma-
tive climates. In this article, we aim to disentangle the
effect of societal normative climates from relevant insti-
tutional policies on individuals’ gender role attitudes. We
focus on policies directly relevant to the behaviours we
study, namely childcare coverage rate and length and
compensation of maternity leave. Additionally, we con-
trol for the country’s economic situation (gross domestic
product, GDP) and level of gender equality (gender
equity index, GEI), which prior research has shown to be
associated with gender role attitudes and division of
housework (Fuwa, 2004; Knudsen and Waerness, 2008).
Research Questions
This study probes the association of normative climate
and gender role attitudes in the European context—
specifically, the disapproval of women and men who
decide to remain childless or work full-time when they
have children aged <3 years. We focus on the disapproval
end of the approval–disapproval spectrum, as these
behaviours are typically seen as proscriptions (‘what not
to do’) rather than prescriptions (‘what to do’). We ask:
1. Are individuals’ perceptions of others’ attitudes (i.e.,
their normative expectations) associated with their
own gender role attitudes? We expect a positive
association, such that when individuals believe that
others disapprove, they will also express stronger
disapproval themselves (Hypothesis 1).
2. What is the normative climate in different European
countries for women and men with regards to volun-
tary childlessness and to parents working full-time
when children are young? Our hypothesis is that per-
ceived disapproval will be more widespread for
women than men on both behaviours because these
pose a stronger threat to traditional women’s roles
(Hypothesis 2).
3. Does the normative climate have an effect on gender
role attitudes over and above individuals’ normative
expectations and other relevant personal characteris-
tics? If so, does the effect hold even after controlling
for country-level characteristics (especially relevant
policies) related to these outcomes? We expect nor-
mative climate to have a positive effect—such that in
countries where many individuals believe that others
disapprove, individuals will express greater disap-
proval themselves (Hypothesis 3). To test for the
robustness of a normative climate effect, we include
several individual- and country-level controls that
have been shown to be important in previous
research.
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Method
Data
We use data from 21 countries in the third round of the
ESS, which included the rotating module ‘The timing of
life: The organization of the life course in Europe’ and
was collected between August 2006 and November
2007 (for information on the module, see ESS Round 3
Data, 2006; Fitzgerald and Widdop, 2007). In each
country, participants were selected as a random proba-
bility sample of all people aged 15 years. The current
study is restricted to those who are aged 18 years. The
survey was carried out in 25 countries, but no design
weights were available for Latvia and Romania (which
were necessary for the construction of normative climate
indicators), and many country-level indicators were not
available for Switzerland and Ukraine.
The module was administered as ‘split ballot’: a ran-
dom half of respondents were asked questions about
women’s lives, while the other half were asked the same
questions about men’s lives. This design provides a
unique opportunity to compare perceptions about
women and men by women and men. However, it does
not enable comparing opinions about men and women
within individuals because respondents were asked
either about women or about men. Separate analyses are
therefore conducted for four groups: women judging




Gender role attitudes were assessed with two items:
‘How much do you approve or disapprove if a woman
[man] chooses never to have children?’ and ‘How much
do you approve or disapprove if a woman [man] has a
full-time job while she [he] has children aged under 3?’.
These items were rated on a 5-point scale: 1 (strongly
disapprove), 2 (disapprove), 3 (neither approve nor dis-
approve), 4 (approve), and 5 (strongly approve). These




Perception of others’ gender role attitudes.
Respondents’ perceptions of others’ gender role attitudes
were assessed with the same items, but with a different
introduction and response scale: ‘Apart from your own
feelings, how do you think most people would react if a
woman [man] they knew well did any of the following?’:
‘How would they react if she [he] chose never to have
children?’ and ‘How would they react if she [he] had a
full-time job while she [he] had children aged under 3?’
These items were rated on a 4-point scale: 1 (most peo-
ple would openly disapprove), 2 (most people would
secretly disapprove), 3 (most people would not mind
either way), and 4 (most people would approve). We
created a dichotomous variable to indicate perceived dis-
approval (1, combining Categories 1 and 2) vs. no per-
ceived disapproval (0, combining Categories 3 and 4).
Control variables. The following individual-level varia-
bles were included as controls: birth cohort (reference:
born before 1946), country of birth (reference: born in
country of data collection), marital status (reference:
married), years of education, religious affiliation (refer-
ence: no religious affiliation), and religious activity
(reference: less than once a month). Additionally, we
control for respondents’ own relevant behaviour,
namely whether they have children (reference: no chil-
dren) and whether they work part- or full-time (refer-
ence: no employment).
Country-level variables
Normative climate. Dichotomous responses from the
perception of others’ gender role attitudes were aggre-
gated on the country level (design weights were applied
in the aggregation). A ratio was created to represent the
share of respondents who perceive that others
disapprove.
Gross domestic product. As an indicator of a country’s
economic situation, we used the 2006 value for GDP at
Purchasing Power Parity per capita, which was available
for all countries.
Gender equity index. GEI is an index of socio-economic
opportunities in the domains of knowledge, economic
resources and participation, and political empowerment
(Mills, 2010). GEI was available for 2007 in all
countries.
Coverage rate for children <3 years old. This variable
indicates the ‘number of places in public (or publicly
subsidized) childcare facilities as a share of the number
of children aged 0 to 2 years’ (Keck and Saraceno, 2011:
p. 61). The information, from the Multilinks Database
on Intergenerational Policy Indicators, was available for
2004 in all countries.
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Maternity leave. This indicator reflects the length and
compensation of maternity leave. It is the product of
two indicators from the Multilinks database:
‘Maximum length of standard maternity leave’ (trans-
formed into months) multiplied with ‘Cash benefit dur-
ing maternity leave in percentage of income before
taking up leave’. The resulting indicator represents num-
ber of months with 100 per cent income, and was avail-
able for 2004 in all countries.
Childlessness rate. The indicator represents the percent-
age of women aged 33–37 years with no children living
in their household. This is an approximate indicator of
childlessness, as ‘these women are old enough to have
had most of the children they are ever going to have;
and they are young enough that only a very small pro-
portion of their children will have left home’ (Iacovou
and Skew, 2010: p. 16). This indicator was available for
2007 in 18 countries (Bulgaria, Norway, and Russia are
exceptions).
Maternal employment rate. From the OECD Family
Database, this indicator represents the percentage of
mothers who work when their children are <3 years of
age. It was available for 2011 in 19 countries (Norway
and Russia are exceptions).
Data Analyses
Multilevel models with individuals at Level 1 and coun-
tries at Level 2 included the 21 countries for which most
relevant variables were available. All country-level vari-
ables were grand-mean-centred. First, intercept-only
models were run to determine the intraclass correlation
coefficients (ICCs). Second, all individual-level variables
(including normative expectations) were included. In the
third model, societal normative climate was added at the
country level. In a fourth step, policies (childcare cover-
age rate and maternity leave) and country-level control
variables (GDP and GEI) were added. To examine the
robustness of the societal normative climate effect, we
also tested additional country-level variables individu-
ally (not reported here but available on request), which
did not change the reported results.
Results
Descriptive Analyses
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of
gender role attitudes, as well as societal normative cli-
mate, for each country. Personal disapproval of fathers
working full-time is generally weaker than disapproval
of mothers working full-time and women and men being
voluntarily childless—and for both men and women in
every country. Differences in the disapproval of men vs.
women are smaller for voluntary childlessness than for
working full-time. Overall, however, there is stronger
disapproval of men who decide to not to have children
than of women who choose not to do so. The lower dis-
approval of women may be owing to the perception that
women must often make a choice between having a fam-
ily and having a career, while men are not typically
faced with such a stark decision and thus have no ‘valid’
reason to remain childless. Respondents in Denmark
and Norway are least disapproving of men and women
who decide to remain childless or work full-time with
young children, while respondents in Bulgaria and
Russia are most disapproving of men and women who
decide to remain childless. Point-biserial correlations
between own gender role attitudes and perception
of others’ gender role attitudes are moderate for all
groups for childlessness (rpb varied between 0.38 and
0.44) and for full-time work (rpb varied between 0.31
and 0.47).
Figures 1 and 2 map, across countries, societal nor-
mative climates regarding voluntary childlessness
and working full-time when having young children,
measured as the percentage of respondents who believe
that others disapprove, and presented separately for
men and women as targets. Normative climate regarding
childlessness varies strongly across countries, and the
variation for women seems greater for childlessness than
for full-time work. The pattern of results observed for
normative climate (average perceived disapproval)
generally mirrors the tendencies observed for gender
role attitudes (respondents’ own disapproval) in Table
1. However, in contrast to gender role attitudes, there
is in most countries a stronger normative climate of
disapproval of voluntary childlessness for women than
for men.
There are sharp cross-country differences in norma-
tive climates related to women’s voluntary childlessness
and full-time work. For instance, in Eastern European
countries, perceived disapproval of women not having
children is more widespread than for mothers working
full-time; in contrast, in liberal market states (i.e., those
that provide minimal support to families, such as the
Netherlands and United Kingdom), perceived disap-
proval of mothers who work full-time is far more wide-
spread than for women who are childless.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, there is more per-
ceived disapproval of women’s voluntary childlessness
(M¼ 42.48, SD¼ 21.35) than of men’s childlessness
(M¼ 39.35, SD¼ 21.79) in 19 out of 21 countries, and
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Table 1. Sample sizes, means, and standard deviations for gender role attitudes (own disapproval) and normative climate,
by country
Sample size Own disapproval Normative climate
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Austria 619 594 455 618 3.11 3.18 3.07 3.15 3.59 3.58 2.38 2.43 39.87 36.53 66.15 12.14
(0.96) (1.05) (0.95) (0.94) (1.00) (1.00) (0.95) (1.10)
Belgium 430 377 418 469 2.41 2.37 2.52 2.60 2.57 2.62 1.79 1.81 28.86 25.06 23.88 5.07
(1.09) (1.08) (1.09) (1.13) (1.15) (1.13) (0.85) (0.85)
Bulgaria 402 255 270 427 4.43 4.50 4.36 4.45 3.23 3.34 1.95 1.94 83.42 83.39 34.38 11.07
(0.95) (0.77) (0.93) (0.87) (1.29) (1.34) (1.31) (1.27)
Cyprus 248 233 219 249 3.77 3.86 3.57 3.71 2.48 2.41 1.98 1.97 78.33 76.97 27.60 8.12
(0.91) (1.00) (1.12) (1.04) (0.92) (0.90) (0.76) (0.80)
Denmark 359 359 359 392 1.59 1.70 1.71 1.70 2.06 2.03 1.58 1.49 16.28 9.97 9.74 1.91
(0.84) (0.92) (0.87) (0.88) (1.11) (1.06) (0.74) (0.65)
Estonia 441 317 312 378 3.93 3.93 3.94 4.02 3.48 3.62 2.10 2.01 68.12 63.95 36.53 5.51
(0.83) (0.76) (0.81) (0.81) (0.80) (0.80) (0.90) (0.89)
Finland 476 452 434 448 2.21 2.33 2.64 2.70 2.32 2.45 1.91 1.73 32.63 29.37 17.54 4.01
(1.01) (1.00) (1.07) (1.13) (0.96) (0.96) (0.71) (0.69)
France 505 465 435 523 3.00 2.94 3.27 3.22 2.86 2.86 2.11 1.97 41.16 38.19 27.43 9.79
(1.10) (1.09) (1.07) (1.12) (1.21) (1.18) (1.07) (0.97)
Germany 727 670 691 684 3.07 3.19 3.16 3.16 3.40 3.42 2.45 2.43 36.16 29.91 59.81 11.18
(0.76) (0.73) (0.76) (0.72) (0.89) (0.84) (0.86) (0.91)
Hungary 423 303 307 441 3.70 3.57 3.50 3.66 3.36 3.38 1.99 1.92 54.28 50.61 43.99 8.24
(0.97) (0.87) (0.82) (0.88) (1.00) (0.94) (0.85) (0.83)
Ireland 423 354 370 439 2.92 2.90 3.06 3.10 2.88 2.94 2.19 2.30 26.73 22.10 23.53 3.25
(0.85) (0.65) (0.74) (0.70) (0.89) (0.79) (0.86) (0.87)
Netherlands 486 420 431 512 2.09 2.26 2.30 2.31 3.22 3.25 1.98 2.16 30.48 29.07 63.79 10.95
(1.03) (1.09) (1.08) (1.03) (1.19) (1.11) (0.85) (0.93)
Norway 405 428 423 408 1.92 2.09 2.05 2.29 2.01 2.15 1.75 1.72 11.81 10.42 11.42 3.14
(0.94) (1.05) (0.90) (0.99) (1.07) (1.06) (0.78) (0.74)
Poland 428 382 382 424 3.33 3.39 3.40 3.47 2.74 2.81 1.98 1.98 47.27 40.02 22.51 6.13
(1.05) (1.02) (0.99) (1.04) (1.01) (0.98) (0.82) (0.76)
Portugal 680 442 393 655 2.92 2.93 2.91 3.01 2.75 2.71 2.37 2.47 31.43 32.27 21.24 12.50
(0.89) (2.71) (0.87) (0.88) (0.86) (0.87) (0.82) (0.85)
Russia 711 435 480 686 4.22 4.20 4.12 4.20 3.49 3.48 2.06 2.01 84.06 82.11 54.39 12.84
(0.80) (0.78) (0.83) (0.77) (0.95) (0.91) (0.99) (0.99)
Slovakia 407 399 389 445 3.61 3.52 3.52 3.64 3.25 3.36 2.11 2.21 54.20 49.12 44.29 12.34
(0.90) (0.88) (0.91) (0.85) (0.98) (0.92) (0.91) (1.00)
Slovenia 361 312 310 402 3.09 3.03 3.26 3.21 2.76 2.82 2.46 2.32 49.92 45.03 23.16 14.58
(1.11) (1.01) (1.01) (1.03) (0.98) (0.98) (0.81) (0.77)
Spain 498 423 436 449 2.76 2.90 2.96 2.96 2.67 2.78 2.11 2.22 33.36 33.26 30.73 13.95
(1.01) (0.93) (1.03) (0.98) (0.95) (0.98) (0.91) (0.90)
Sweden 471 439 474 466 2.20 2.41 2.66 2.72 2.62 2.67 2.41 2.50 24.49 21.66 25.14 8.88
(0.87) (0.87) (0.80) (0.86) (1.06) (1.01) (0.86) (0.85)
United
Kingdom
649 525 515 623 2.71 2.77 2.82 2.90 3.18 3.34 2.19 2.19 19.29 16.97 43.33 5.06
(0.78) (0.73) (0.78) (0.63) (0.91) (0.83) (0.84) (0.87)
Note. W ¼ female respondents, M ¼ male respondents.
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the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is significant (P < 0.001).
The difference in perceived disapproval for women and
men is also present—and much stronger—for full-time
work: In all countries, perceived disapproval of mothers’
full-time work (M¼33.84, SD¼ 16.54) is much more
widespread than perceived disapproval of fathers’ full-
time work (M¼ 8.61, SD¼3.93, P < 0.001).
Table 2 shows the correlations among the country-
level indicators and normative climates of voluntary
childlessness and full-time work for men and for
women. The two normative climate variables are moder-
ately correlated for men and for women. Normative cli-
mate regarding childlessness is negatively associated
with all variables except maternity leave, which is
Figure 1. Normative climate of disapproval of voluntary childlessness for women (top) and men (bottom). The shading scale repre-
sents the percentage of respondents who believe that others disapprove. The dotted pattern represents countries for which no
data were available.
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positive. Normative climate concerning women’s full-
time work is negatively associated with childcare cover-
age rate, while normative climate concerning men’s
full-time work is negatively associated with GDP. None
of the correlations present problems of multicollinearity,
with the exception of the correlation between GDP and
normative climate regarding childlessness. For this rea-
son, we also tested models of childlessness without
GDP, and all results remained the same.
Model Testing
We first describe the results for voluntary childlessness,
and then turn to working full-time when children are <3
years of age.
Voluntary childlessness
In Step 1, we ran intercept-only models to determine the
variance at the individual and country level (Table 3).
For personal disapproval of childlessness, the ICCs
Figure 2. Normative climate of disapproval of full-time work for women (top) and men (bottom) who have children <3 years of age.
The shading scale represents the percentage of respondents who believe that others disapprove. The dotted pattern represents
countries for which no data were available.
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show that there is great variance at the country level
(>30 per cent) for both men and women.
In Step 2, we included all individual-level variables
simultaneously. Consistent with the first hypothesis, the
more respondents believe that others disapprove of vol-
untary childlessness, the more they disapproved them-
selves, and this is true for all groups of respondents (i.e.,
effect of normative expectations). Respondents born
before 1946 disapprove more of childless men and
women than younger birth cohorts, immigrants disap-
prove more than natives, and married respondents dis-
approve more than single and divorced respondents.
Religious individuals disapprove more than others.
Respondents who are unemployed or non-active disap-
prove more than those in part-time or full-time employ-
ment. Education is only relevant when men judged
women and women judged men: In these cases, those
with lower education disapprove more than those with
higher education. Not surprisingly, respondents with
children express much stronger disapproval than those
who are childless.
In Step 3 we included - in addition to the previous
variables - only societal normative climate as country-
level variable. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, normative
climate has a significant positive effect in all four groups
(women judging women: B¼0.03, S.E.¼0.00,
P < 0.001; men judging women: B¼0.03, S.E.¼0.00,
P < 0.001; men judging men: B¼0.02, S.E.¼0.00,
P < 0.001; women judging men: B¼0.02, S.E.¼0.00,
P < 0.001). In countries where many people believe that
others disapprove of childlessness, respondents generally
disapprove more of childlessness.
In Step 4 (shown in Table 3), we included the family-
work policy indicators, as well as GDP and GEI. The
economic situation in the country has no impact on dis-
approval of childlessness, while women in countries
with lower gender equity express greater disapproval of
women who are childless. In countries where the child-
care coverage rate for children <3 years of age is high,
men are less disapproving of women who decide not to
have children. In countries with longer and better-
compensated maternity leave, respondents are less dis-
approving of men who remain childless. Importantly,
the societal normative climate effect remains significant
in all groups of respondents, even when controlling for
these country-level indicators.
In a separate model (owing to missing information in
several countries, n¼ 18), we included the country-level
childlessness rate to test the robustness of the normative
climate effect. The proportion of childless women is not
Table 2. Correlation coefficients between country-level variables and climates of voluntary childlessness and full-time














Climate childlessness 0.44* 0.83*** 0.56** 0.46* 0.50* 0.48* 0.47*
(N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 19) (N¼ 18)
Climate full-time work 0.28 0.22 0.49* 0.27 0.24 0.17
About men (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 19) (N¼ 18)
Climate childlessness 0.55* 0.85*** 0.57** 0.47* 0.50* 0.46 0.52*
(N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 19) (N¼ 18)
Climate full-time work 0.55** 0.23 0.30 0.37 0.14 0.08
(N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 19) (N¼ 18)
All
GDP 0.33 0.42 0.47* 0.47* 0.49*
(N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 19) (N¼ 18)
GEI 0.29 0.15 0.21 0.56*
(N¼ 21) (N¼ 21) (N¼ 19) (N¼ 18)
Coverage rate under 3 0.16 0.49* 0.01
(N¼ 21) (N¼ 19) (N¼ 18)
Maternity leave 0.22 0.18
(N¼ 19) (N¼ 18)
Maternal employment 0.11
(N¼ 18)
Note. Spearman coefficients. ***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05.
European Sociological Review, 2015, Vol. 0, No. 0 9
associated with personal disapproval of childlessness
(women judging women: B¼ 0.01, S.E.¼ 0.02,
P>0.05; men judging women: B¼ 0.01, S.E.¼ 0.01,
P>0.05; men judging men: B¼ 0.01, S.E.¼ 0.01,
P>0.05; women judging men: B¼ 0.01, S.E.¼ 0.01,
P>0.05), and the effect of societal normative climate
remains significant in all groups.
Working full-time when children are <3 years of age
We followed the same procedure for analysing disap-
proval of parents who work full-time work when chil-
dren are young (see Table 4). Relative to voluntary
childlessness, the country-level variance for working
full-time is much smaller but nonetheless remarkable,
especially for disapproval of mothers. In contrast, the
between-country variance for men working full-time is
small (<10 per cent).
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the more respondents
believe that others disapprove of fathers and mothers
who work full-time when they have young children, the
more they themselves disapprove—and this is again true
for all groups of respondents (i.e., effect of normative
expectations). Generally, the individual-level variables
have a bigger impact on disapproval of mothers who
work full-time than of fathers who do so. Similar to child-
lessness, respondents from cohorts born before 1946 dis-
approve more of mothers working full-time than younger
birth cohorts, but there is no such effect for fathers work-
ing full-time. However, men <30 years of age are more
Table 3. Final multilevel models for disapproval of voluntary childlessness, for each group








B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.)
Individual level
Intercept 2.76 (0.07)*** 2.78 (0.07)*** 2.81 (0.07)*** 2.94 (0.06)***
Cohort 1946–1955 vs. cohort < 1946 0.16 (0.03)*** 0.08 (0.04)* 0.09 (0.04)** 0.17 (0.03)***
Cohort 1956–1965 vs. cohort < 1946 0.28 (0.04)*** 0.17 (0.04)*** 0.18 (0.04)*** 0.26 (0.03)***
Cohort 1966–1975 vs. cohort < 1946 0.29 (0.04)*** 0.23 (0.04)*** 0.23 (0.04)*** 0.30 (0.04)***
Cohort> 1975 vs. cohort < 1946 0.10 (0.04)* 0.09 (0.04)* 0.13 (0.04)** 0.14 (0.04)***
Country of birth: other 0.16 (0.04)*** 0.10 (0.04)* 0.14 (0.04)** 0.12 (0.04)**
Single vs. married 0.11 (0.03)** 0.02 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.06 (0.03)
Divorced vs. married 0.13 (0.03)*** 0.09 (0.04)* 0.09 (0.04)* 0.07 (0.03)*
Widowed vs. married 0.07 (0.03)* 0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.03)
Children 0.27 (0.03)*** 0.18 (0.03)*** 0.24 (0.03)*** 0.18 (0.03)***
Years of education 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)** 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)***
Part-time vs. no employment 0.06 (0.03) 0.24 (0.06)*** 0.05 (0.06) 0.01 (0.03)*
Full-time vs. no employment 0.04 (0.03) 0.08 (0.03)** 0.07 (0.03)** 0.05 (0.02)
Catholic vs. no religion 0.08 (0.03)** 0.04 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03)** 0.14 (0.03)***
Other Christian vs. no religion 0.06 (0.03)* 0.11 (0.03)*** 0.12 (0.03)*** 0.10 (0.03)***
Other non-Christian vs. no religion 0.37 (0.08)*** 0.54 (0.08)*** 0.33 (0.08)*** 0.28 (0.08)***
Religious activity 0.20 (0.03)*** 0.13 (0.03)*** 0.12 (0.03)*** 0.10 (0.03)***
Perception of others’ disapproval 0.42 (0.02)*** 0.54 (0.02)*** 0.57 (0.02)*** 0.57 (0.02)***
Country level
Normative climate 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.00)***
GDP 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Gender equality GEI 0.02 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Coverage rate for children under 3 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Maternity leave (length and compensation) 0.15 (0.09) 0.14 (0.08) 0.17 (0.08)* 0.22 (0.08)**
Variance components
ICC (intercept-only) 0.395 0.377 0.334 0.342
Within-country variance (intercept-only) 0.879 0.861 0.859 0.840
Between-country variance (intercept-only) 0.575 0.521 0.430 0.437
Within-country variance (all predictors) 0.783 0.772 0.742 0.742
Between-country variance (all predictors) 0.059 0.058 0.055 0.049
Note. ***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05.
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disapproving of fathers working full-time than men aged
60 years. Education has a complex effect for men: Men
with lower education are more disapproving of mothers
working full-time, but less disapproving of fathers work-
ing full-time, than men with higher education.
Native and married women are more disapproving
of mothers working full-time than immigrant and single
women, and married women are also more disapproving
of fathers working full-time. Respondents without chil-
dren are more disapproving of fathers working full-time,
and religious individuals disapprove more strongly than
others. Not surprisingly, respondents who work part- or
full-time are less disapproving of mothers working full-
time, and women working full-time are also less disap-
proving of fathers working full-time.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, societal normative cli-
mate has a significant effect on personal disapproval,
such that in countries where many people believe that
others disapprove of full-time work with children,
respondents are also more disapproving (women judging
mothers: B¼0.02, S.E.¼0.00, P< 0.001; men judging
mothers: B¼0.02, S.E.¼ 0.00, P< 0.001; men
judging fathers: B¼ 0.03, S.E.¼ 0.01, P¼ 0.010; women
judging fathers: B¼0.03, S.E.¼ 0.01, P¼ 0.002).
In lower GDP countries, respondents are more disap-
proving of mothers who work full-time when they have
young children. As with the findings on childlessness,
women in countries with lower gender equity are more
disapproving of mothers who work full-time. In coun-
tries with longer and better-compensated maternity
Table 4. Final multilevel models for disapproval of parents who work full-time while children are <3 years of age, for each
group








B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.)
Individual level
Intercept 2.90 (0.06)*** 2.82 (0.06)*** 2.05 (0.06)*** 2.12 (0.06)***
Cohort 1946–1955 vs. cohort < 1946 0.11 (0.03)** 0.08 (0.04)* 0.05 (0.04) 0.02 (0.03)
Cohort 1956–1965 vs. cohort < 1946 0.16 (0.04)*** 0.19 (0.04)*** 0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.03)
Cohort 1966–1975 vs. cohort < 1946 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.24 (0.04)*** 0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.03)
Cohort> 1975 vs. cohort < 1946 0.25 (0.04)*** 0.13 (0.05)** 0.11 (0.04)** 0.02 (0.04)
Country of birth: other 0.11 (0.03)** 0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Single vs. married 0.09 (0.03)** 0.04 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.03)
Divorced vs. married 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03)
Widowed vs. married 0.02 (0.03) 0.10 (0.06) 0.04 (0.05) 0.08 (0.03)**
Children 0.01 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.07 (0.03)* 0.06 (0.03)*
Years of education 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.00 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00)
Part-time vs. no employment 0.09 (0.04)** 0.16 (0.06)** 0.05 (0.05) 0.03 (0.03)
Full-time vs. no employment 0.22 (0.03)*** 0.08 (0.03)** 0.04 (0.03) 0.08 (0.02)***
Catholic vs. no religion 0.06 (0.03)* 0.02 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03)
Other Christian vs. no religion 0.13 (0.03)*** 0.05 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
Other non-Christian vs. no religion 0.34 (0.08)*** 0.43 (0.08)*** 0.08 (0.08) 0.02 (0.07)
Religious activity 0.17 (0.03)*** 0.12 (0.03)*** 0.03 (0.03) 0.06 (0.02)**
Perception of others’ disapproval 0.75 (0.02)*** 0.82 (0.02)*** 0.91 (0.04)*** 0.99 (0.03)***
Country level
Normative climate 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.03 (0.01)* 0.04 (0.01)**
GDP 0.00 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Gender equality GEI 0.02 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Coverage rate for children under 3 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Maternity leave (length and compensation) 0.08 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07) 0.10 (0.07) 0.15 (0.07)*
Variance components
ICC (intercept-only) 0.171 0.181 0.063 0.080
Within-country variance (intercept-only) 1.015 0.974 0.782 0.811
Between-country variance (intercept-only) 0.210 0.215 0.053 0.071
Within-country variance (all predictors) 0.841 0.792 0.692 0.704
Between-country variance (all predictors) 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.037
Note. ***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05.
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leave, women disapprove less of fathers who work full-
time. However, these policy indicators have no impact
on how women and men think about mothers, or on
how men think about fathers.
In a separate model (owing to missing information
in some countries, n¼ 19), we included the
country-level maternal employment rate to test the
robustness of the normative climate effect. The
percentage of mothers working is not associated with
disapproval of mothers or fathers who work
full-time (women judging mothers: B¼ 0.00,
S.E.¼0.00, P> 0.05; men judging mothers: B¼0.01,
S.E.¼0.00, P>0.05; men judging fathers: B¼ 0.00,
S.E.¼0.00, P>0.05; women judging fathers: B¼ 0.00,
S.E.¼0.00, P> 0.05). As before, the normative climate
effect remains significant in all groups of respondents
after controlling for the country-level indicators.
Discussion
Societal Normative Climates across Europe
Our first aim was to describe normative climates of
parenthood across Europe, focusing on two issues that
potentially threaten traditional views of adulthood and
family life: women and men who choose to remain
childless or to work full-time when they have young
children. The descriptive statistics indicated that societal
normative climates regarding these behaviours differed
significantly across countries. While the perception that
having children is primordial for women and men is
shared by many respondents in Eastern European coun-
tries, a smaller portion of respondents perceive disap-
proval of voluntary childlessness for men and women in
countries with liberal market states, such as the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, which provide only mini-
mal support for families. However, in these latter coun-
tries, as well as in some countries with conservative
states like Austria and Germany, a much higher percent-
age of respondents believe that mothers but not fathers
are expected to stop working full-time to take care of
their children. This is much less the case for women in
Eastern European countries, where mothers’ participa-
tion in the labour market has been encouraged by com-
munist states (Brunnbauer, 2000). The societal
normative climates surrounding voluntary childlessness
and full-time work for parents with young children were
themselves only moderately associated for both men and
women.
It is important to note, however, that people gener-
ally perceived more disapproval of women than of men
for both behaviours, as predicted by Hypothesis 2.
Motherhood is seen as central in women’s lives, and
many respondents thought that women who reject this
life transition are subject to significant social disap-
proval. There was little perceived disapproval of fathers’
full-time work across Europe, but perceived disapproval
of the rejection of fatherhood was much more wide-
spread and similar to perceived disapproval of the rejec-
tion of motherhood. Having children is thus collectively
valued as a central event of both women’s and men’s
lives. In contrast, the raising of children is perceived to
be women’s role much more than men’s, suggesting that
the traditional male breadwinner model generally
remains valid in most contexts.
Societal Normative Climates and Individuals’
Gender Role Attitudes
Our second aim was to assess whether normative cli-
mates are associated with gender role attitudes over and
above individual-level characteristics and, if so, whether
the effect remains after controlling for country-level
characteristics. First, individuals who believed that
others disapprove of voluntary childlessness and full-
time work for parents with young children also reported
more disapproval of these behaviours themselves
(Hypothesis 1, effect of normative expectations). This
effect was strongly significant even after controlling for
individual-level characteristics, such as own relevant
behaviour.
The major finding, however, was the persistent and
robust effect of societal normative climate on gender
role attitudes (Hypothesis 3). In countries where a
higher share of respondents perceived disapproval of
childlessness or of parents with young children who
work full-time, respondents themselves disapproved
more strongly—even after controlling for their own per-
ception of others’ disapproval. This climate effect was
not due to the fact that people who disapproved also
believed that others disapproved more. By including the
perception of others’ disapproval on both individual and
country levels, we showed a consistently strong contex-
tual effect, indicating that individuals disapprove more
when they live in a country where many people believe
that others disapprove.
In additional analyses (available on request), we
tested for cross-level interactions between perception of
others’ disapproval (i.e., normative expectation) and
normative climate. With the exception of women’s judg-
ment of other women’s childlessness, none of the inter-
actions were significant. These results revealed that
respondents who themselves perceived others’ disap-
proval tended to express even stronger disapproval
when they live in societies where the perception of
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others’ disapproval is collectively shared. More strik-
ingly, in such climates, even those who believe that
others approve (for example, because of their specific
social position) tended to express more negative views
than their counterparts who live in societies where there
is less consensus in the perception of disapproval. This
reveals that the impact of normative climates can shape
individuals’ positions beyond their own interpretation of
public opinion. In other words, how people speak about
relevant societal issues is, among other things, shaped by
internalized societal codes that can go beyond their con-
scious ‘rational’ reading of public opinion. This is in
accordance with Bodor (2012: p. 272), who, referring to
Noelle-Neumann’s (2001) ‘spiral of silence’ theory of
the influence of public opinion, stresses that ‘the climate
of opinion is not perceived via some sort of conscious
process or in a calculating fashion . . . Instead, individu-
als sense the opinion climate—at least in part—
unconsciously’.
Furthermore, the effect of normative climate per-
sisted after controlling for relevant individual-level vari-
ables, such as respondents’ own relevant behaviour (e.g.,
parental and employment statuses), religiosity, educa-
tion, and cohort. Again, this illustrates the importance
of the normative climate, as it affects even individuals
who themselves engage in the disapproved behaviours
(e.g., individuals without children).
Finally, by controlling for relevant country-level vari-
ables, we showed that general levels of gender equity or
policies in a given country could not explain the effect of
normative climate. Normative climate carried an inde-
pendent effect. Even more, differences in gender role
attitudes between countries were almost completely
explained by differences in the normative climate within
countries. This does not mean that normative climates
and policies are unrelated. To the contrary, we suggest
that normative climates are influenced by, and in turn
influence, policies and institutions. However, the fact
that the normative climate effect did not disappear once
we introduced policy indicators revealed that the norma-
tive climate could not be equated with or reduced to
effects of policies and institutions.
Effects of Individual- and Country-Level
Variables
Individual-level predictors found in previous research
were largely confirmed in this study. Older, less edu-
cated, and religious individuals disapprove more of vol-
untary childlessness and mothers’ full-time work than
others. Married women disapprove more of childless-
ness and mothers’ full-time work than single and
divorced women, which may reflect their different life
style. Interestingly, younger and highly educated men
disapprove more of fathers working full-time than do
older and less educated men. Stronger disapproval seems
to reflect an endorsement of more egalitarian gender
roles, emphasizing the role of fathers in caring for young
children as opposed to their traditional and more exclu-
sive role as breadwinners.
Results concerning the effect of family-work policies
were more complex than anticipated. Childcare cover-
age rate had almost no effect, but maternity leave
decreased disapproval of men but not of women who
work full-time and are voluntarily childless. The effect
for fathers’ full-time work may be due to the two-sided
nature of maternity leave. Maternity leave helps recon-
cile work-family tensions, but it also ensures that it is
women who care for young children while men work
full-time. The effect for men’s childlessness is difficult to
interpret and further research is necessary to detect
underlying mechanisms.
Interestingly, gender equality only had an impact on
women who judge other women: Women who live in
highly unequal societies judged other women more
severely, which may reflect their personal experiences.
Women in unequal countries have fewer opportunities,
are generally less educated, and have lower employment
positions. This may reinforce and validate traditional
life courses and foster their disapproval of women who
seem to prioritize their careers over children. The lower
disapproval of mothers’ full-time work in higher GDP
countries is likely due to the fact that childcare coverage
and maternal employment rates are also higher in these
countries, thus making mother’s employment more nor-
mal and acceptable. The two behaviour-based country-
level indicators (i.e., childlessness rate and maternal
employment rate) had no effect on disapproval of men
and women. The absence of effect of maternal employ-
ment rate on disapproval of working mothers was due
to the inclusion of GDP: In models without GDP (not
shown here), there was an effect of maternal employ-
ment rate on disapproval of mothers who work full-
time. The absence of an effect of childlessness rate may
be owing to the fact that such a measure cannot capture
lifelong childlessness.
Our study considered normative climates at the
national level because we were interested in depicting
the influence of social norms at the broader societal
level, which is relevant for norm transmission through
public debate, mass media, and institutional settings.
However, normative climates are surely shaped by and
exert their influence at various levels (e.g., local com-
munities, transnational linguistically defined spaces) and
in various groups and contexts (e.g., occupational areas,
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religious communities, or virtual social media commun-
ities), making it likely that multiple normative climates
coexist within a country and beyond its borders. Future
research should compare the nature and experience of
normative climates at the societal level with those oper-
ating at more local levels and in different types of social
groups and communities.
Conclusion
Normative climates regarding the roles of men and
women in society are highly variable across Europe,
especially regarding women’s roles as mothers and
workers. Furthermore, the weak and less variable nor-
mative climate concerning fathers’ full-time work sug-
gests that the traditional role of the male breadwinner is
not contested.
Most importantly, normative climates are reliably and
strongly associated with individuals’ gender role attitudes
independently of relevant individual- and country-level
characteristics. This finding is particularly important in
terms of social change and points to an important direc-
tion for future research concerned with the effectiveness
of policies: Although policies and normative climates are
related, the persistence of the normative climate effect
suggests that a change in attitudes (and likely behaviours)
depends not only on a change in policies, but a change in
the reigning normative climate, which is likely to be
much slower and more gradual. The study of normative
climates thus seems crucial for understanding contempo-
rary gender role attitudes and their evolution.
The independent effect of normative climates also
represents an important angle for understanding the
latent role of norms in contemporary European soci-
eties. In these societies, which often emphasize flexibility
and freedom in individual life choices, behaviours seem
less constrained by strict traditional and religious regula-
tions. However, in such environments, societal codes
concerning appropriate behaviours may nonetheless
exist and exert a powerful and independent influence on
individuals. That is, they seem to be internalized to such
an extent that they shape individuals’ opinions above
and beyond their personal perceptions of prevailing
norms. The results and methods presented here demon-
strate this less visible but nonetheless significant impact
of societal influences on attitudes about the contempo-
rary roles of men and women.
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